This working paper focuses on the accountability arrangements for the ECB in the framework of the EU's Banking Union. For this purpose, first of all an analytical framework for the purposes of evaluating the preconditions and instruments of accountability placed at the disposal of the European Parliament in the Single Supervisory Mechanism is set out. Thereafter the powers conferred on the European Parliament in the legal framework of the SSM to hold the Supervisory Board to account for the exercise of its duties are examined based on this framework. Notably, the paper highlights the lack of a clear yardstick against which to assess the ECB's performance in the area of banking supervision, as well as a gap in terms of the ability of the European Parliament to assign consequences to the ECB's conduct. Furthermore, the interaction between the European Parliament and the Supervisory Board of the ECB, as evidenced through the parliamentary hearings that have been held thus far, is examined. A qualitative analysis of these hearings notably highlights the topics covered in those hearings, as well as the attitude of the MEPs towards the institutional structure and accountability arrangements in the Banking Union. Finally, a number of concrete proposals for enhancing the role of the European Parliament as an accountability holder in the Banking Union are made.
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I. Introduction
The Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (SSM Regulation) has conferred specific supervisory tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB). The latter is currently responsible for the supervision of 124 'significant' banks or cross-border groups that are established in Euro area
Member States, whereas the national authorities supervise 'less significant' banks or branches 'with a focus on protecting the stability of the financial system of the Union.' 1 One of the (many) remarkable features of the SSM Regulation is the inclusion of two provisions directly addressing the accountability of the ECB and namely its Supervisory Board vis-à-vis the European Parliament (EP) and the national parliaments (NPs) of the participating Member States. With this a practice is continued and extended that has started with the monetary dialogue for monetary policy and thereafter found its way into secondary Union law in the shape of the economic dialogues as part of the Six Pack 2 and Two Pack legislation.
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As this supervisory dialogue between the ECB and the EP is a relatively new feature, this paper aims to provide evidence for the effectiveness of this mechanism as a means to hold the ECB to account for its conduct in the context of the SSM by specifically analyzing the interaction between the EP and the ECB, which is governed by the SSM Regulation and further specified in the related
Interinstitutional Agreement between these two Union institutions. Rather than to duplicate existing studies offering a more or less descriptive analysis of the legal framework and the inter- institutional dynamics involved, the paper will focus on a qualitative assessment of actual practice in these first years of the existence of the supervisory dialogue. In doing so this version of the working paper focuses on the exchanges between the Chair of the ECB's main decision-preparing body on SSM matters, i.e. the Supervisory Board, and the EP's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. In this context, the notion of 'meaningful prudential supervision dialogue' stated in the title of this working paper is directly linked to the notion of accountability. By evaluating the practical modalities and outcomes of the interaction between the ECB and the European Parliament in the SSM against an explicit yardstick of accountability, tentative conclusions about the value of this procedure as a way to hold the ECB to account for the exercise of its prudential supervisory tasks can be drawn and, where applicable, recommendations can be made on the ways in which this interaction may be improved. Moreover, these findings can be put into perspective by looking at previous studies that have undertaken such an exercise for the pre-existing monetary dialogue between the ECB and the EP and that have come up with rather mixed results in terms of the usefulness of this forum in increasing accountability. While in its current shape this working paper will thus focus on the relationship of the European prudential supervisor with the EP, it is envisaged that at a later stage the paper may extent this analysis to include the relationship with national parliaments. 4 Moreover, as provisions similar to the one found in the SSM Regulation also exist in the framework of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in the second pillar of the European Banking Union, 5 a future version of this working paper may also include a comparison of the accountability practices in these two pillars of the Banking Union.
Thereafter, section 2 provides the theoretical background and broad analytical framework for the study of parliamentary hearings as an accountability mechanism. Section 3 offers a brief overview of the legal framework governing the relationship between the EP and the ECB in the framework of the SSM. In section 4 a -for the time being-mostly qualitative analysis of the actual exchanges between these two Union institutions is offered. Section 5 draws some preliminary conclusions on 4 The latter is dealt with in Article 21 SSM Regulation. the current state of affairs, thereby providing a tentative answer to the somewhat rhetoric question asked in the title of this paper.
II. On the function of parliamentary hearings as accountability mechanism
From a conceptual point of view, the function of parliamentary hearings in holding the ECB or any other body exercising public authority for that matter to account needs to be determined. For this purpose, the somewhat vague term 'accountability' requires specification. Moreover, the conditions in which parliamentary hearings can fulfil an accountability function have to be identified.
As has become clear namely from an analysis of the SSM Regulation and a study of the evergrowing literature on the subject matter that does not have to be reproduced here, the ECB has been given numerous substantial powers not only relating to credit institutions under its direct supervision but also relating to the oversight over NCAs in the exercise of SSM-related tasks. 6 To the extent that the European legislator has thus entrusted the ECB with the exercise of public authority, mechanisms must be in place to ensure the back coupling to one or more main political institutions, which ensure the democratic legitimacy of governance and the observance of the rule of law in the European Union. 7 As such, the basic case for the accountability of the ECB for its As has been observed elsewhere, in abstract terms accountability can be defined as a concept that stands for the 'continuous control of power', as well as 'the notion that the accountee takes responsibility for failure and takes steps to prevent their recurrence'. 11 Arguably, an indispensable part of any meaningful accountability is that the party to which the accountee has to answer is in a position, if needed, to assign consequences to its evaluation of the performance, e.g. in the case of bad performance or abuse of power. It is only in the presence of the latter power that in multiple principle-agent relationships, as can be observed in the case of the delegation of legislative or executive tasks onto independent agencies, the party at the helm of the accountability mechanism (principle), e.g. the government or parliament, can itself be held to account for the way in which it exercises its accountability powers vis-à-vis the independent agency, e.g. by parliament, the judiciary or the electorate.
From this abstract approach two principal elements of accountability can be dissected that provide a basic analytical framework for the evaluation of accountability arrangements in the books and in action (de jure and de facto), namely preconditions and instruments of accountability. 12 If the essence of accountability is that the party at the helm of mechanism can pass an informed judgment on the performance of the agent and can assign consequences to this judgment, the existence of a sufficiently clear standard based on which the performance can be evaluated, as well as the availability of relevant information on the activities of the accountee, form two essential preconditions of accountability.
In the absence of clear predetermined objectives or standards based on which the action by the accountee can be assessed, it remains unclear for the latter what exactly is expected in term of performance. Moreover, in such a case any evaluation bears the danger of being aimless or arbitrary. Where the legislator has chosen to vest specific public powers in an independent agency, a clear and unequivocal yardstick also contributes to shielding the latter from undesirable political influence. The dangers loom large in the case of vague, very broad or multiple objectives without a clear hierarchical order. 13 Institutional exchanges, such as parliamentary hearings, may in the 'best-case' scenario have the character of a general exchange of information, without however focusing on the question whether the accountee has met the predefined objectives or targets, and in the 'worst-case' scenario deteriorate to a political settling of scores. As a side effect, this also makes any evaluation of the performance of the party at the helm of the accountability mechanism problematic. As regards financial market regulation and supervision, it has been observed that they are often characterised by entailing not only several objectives, but also several instruments and at 12 As developed in Amtenbrink (1999) 16 Focusing here on information, this can be provided by means of (legally prescribed)
reporting requirements through regular publications, such as monthly, quarterly and annual reports or projections, but can also emerge from institutional contacts between the accountee and the party at the helm of the accountability mechanism. In this context, it has been observed for the national context that contacts with parliament have to be considered 'as the most important institutional contact for the democratic accountability of the agency', as the latter regularly has the power to change the legal basis of the accountee. 17 While parliament can discuss the performance of the agency on a regular basis, the latter can 'explain and justify its conduct' not only to democratically elected parliamentarians, but -in the case of public hearings-the public at large. 18 It is thus hardly surprising that legal arrangements on the appearance of central bank officials before parliament are not uncommon around the globe. 19 Institutional contacts can also exist with (executive) government, which is of particular importance, if government is primarily or in the first line in charge of the accountability mechanism. What becomes clear from this is that parliamentary hearings can in principle fulfil an important role in agency accountability. To what extent this is in fact the case depends not only on the concrete (legal) arrangements concerning such institutional contacts, the agency's objective(s) and applicable transparency, but more generally on the extent to which parliament has instruments at its disposal to assign consequences to its judgment.
III. The accountability framework of the SSM Regulation
Differently to what could previously be observed for the monetary policy function of the ECB, the legal basis of the SSM includes several provisions explicitly addressing the accountability of the the ECB and which complements the SSM Regulation. 22 The latter agreement sets out the practical modalities for the exercise of what is referred to as 'democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the SSM'. 23 Applying the basic analytical framework introduced in section 2 of this article, the arrangements relating to prerequisites of accountability and instruments can be differentiated in the following manner.
Provision of information and institutional contacts
The basic legal obligations introduced by Article 20 SSM Regulation are reporting requirements, hearings and ad hoc exchanges, as well as the response to written questions. 24 The ECB is obliged to submit an annual report not only to the European Parliament, but also to the Council, the including not only the execution of supervisory tasks, but also for instance the sharing of tasks with the national supervisory authorities, the cooperation with other national or Union relevant authorities, and the separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. 26 The Chair of the ECB's Supervisory Board is obliged to present the report in public to the European Parliament, whereby the latter receives the report on a confidential basis four working days in advance of the hearing. 27 The Annual Report must thereafter also be published on the website of the SSM. Finally, the information duties of the ECB also extend to the acts it adopts. According to the Interinstitutional Agreement, the ECB must duly inform the ECON Committee of the procedures (including timing) it has set up for the adoption of regulations, decisions, guidelines and recommendations that are subject to public consultation in accordance with the SSM Regulation.
The ECB must, in particular, provide information on the principles and kinds of indicators or information it is generally using in developing acts and policy recommendations, with a view to enhancing transparency and policy consistency. Moreover, the ECB must transmit the draft acts before the beginning of the public consultation procedure. Where the European Parliament submits comments on the acts, there may be informal exchanges of views with the ECB on such comments, in parallel with the open public consultations. Once the ECB has adopted an act, it must forward it to the ECON Committee. Finally, the ECB is obliged to regularly inform the European Parliament in writing about the need to update adopted acts. The ECB itself has defined financial stability as 'a state whereby the build-up of systemic risk is prevented'. 42 In turn, according to the ECB, '[s]ystemic risk can best be described as the risk that the provision of necessary financial products and services by the financial system will be impaired to a point where economic growth and welfare may be materially affected. TFEU, by requiring that it consents to the recommendations of the Council'. 50 This proposal is reminiscent of the arrangements governing the Fed, whereby any appointment to the Board of
Governors by the President of the United States has to be confirmed by the US Senate. 51 The implementation of this proposal would, however, require an amendment of primary Union law.
Beyond the obvious motivation to increase the European Parliament's role in the accountability of the ECB for its monetary policy tasks, it can also be observed that a substantive role of the European Parliament in the appointment of the members of the Executive Board would also be a recognition of the fact that its members form an integral part of the ECB's Governing Council, which pursuant to the SSM Regulation, formally adopts (or objects to) supervisory decisions that are prepared by the Supervisory Board.
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The European Parliament's approval is further required for the removal of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board from office. 53 The approval process again requires a vote in the ECON Committee and in plenary. 54 The SSM Regulation provides that these officials can only be removed from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or have been guilty of serious misconduct. 55 For those purposes, the European Parliament may inform the ECB that it considers the conditions for the removal of those officials from office to be fulfilled. 56 The ECB must provide its considerations in writing. 57 What becomes clear from this provision is that the dismissal procedure cannot in principle be used by the European Parliament as an accountability instrument to assign consequences to bad performance.
Concerning the financing of the SSM-related activities of the ECB it will be recalled first of all that the budget of the ECB does not form part of the general budget of the EU and hence is not part of the decision on the annual budget pursuant Article 314 TFEU which the European 
IV. Initial evidence from parliamentary practice
In observing parliamentary practice to date, this working paper focuses on two main aspects that deserve consideration, namely the internal organisation in the ECON Committee and the actual course of events during the encounters with ECB officials.
Organisational aspects
As regards the internal organisation of the European Parliament, in preparation of the coming into operation of the SSM, the so-called Banking Union Working Group (BUWG) was set up in briefing papers take the form of an in-depth analysis of specific issues. In the case of the SSM, this includes items such as bank structural reform, conduct risk, and internal rating models.
Interestingly, on the website of the ECON Committee no specific information on the composition and selection procedure of this expert group could be found, and its composition can only be divined by glancing at the authors of the expert studies that are made available on the website.
This opaqueness surrounding the external experts is quite remarkable considering that the European Parliament regards these briefing papers to 'form part of the scrutiny of the Banking Union'.
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Next to the external briefing papers, EGOV also issues its own briefing papers in preparation of the regular hearings and ad hoc exchanges with the ECB. These internal briefings analyse issues based on publicly available information and, according to the European Parliament, are made available for information purposes only. An illustration thereof is the briefing paper for the meeting 68 Moreover, the internal briefing paper typically includes a summary (or an abstract) of the external briefing papers. In case there are more than one external briefing papers for a meeting, there can also be a separate note (or a 'summary') consolidating the summaries of those external briefing papers. For example, before the ECB took on its new banking supervision tasks, it carried out a financial health check of all banks to be supervised, consisting
of an asset quality review and a stress test. Given the importance of those preparations, the ECON Committee commissioned two experts to assess the 'Robustness, Validity and Significance of the ECB's Asset Quality Review and Stress Test Exercise', and the key findings of their studies were then outlined in a two-page note. 69 One last aspect regarding the ECON scrutiny of the SSM is, according to the information received by the authors, the existence of a 'secret room' where MEPs can consult confidential documents such as the reports of the SSM boards, supervisory reports, and so on.
Observations from the regular hearings and ad hoc exchanges
Turning to the actual encounters between the ECON Committee and ECB officials, at the time of emerges from an initial analysis is that these questions can be put into different categories. Firstly, there are questions which arguably clearly focus on (the duties of) the SSM. Here, a whole range of issues are discussed, concerning bank supervision, non-performing exposures (notably, nonperforming loans), capital requirements, stress tests, the Basel rules, accounting standards, proposed EU rules whose adoption is still pending, and the completion of the Banking Union's architecture. Moreover, the institutional interaction between the SSM, EBA, the monetary policy function of the ECB, and the NCAs is also subject of debate. What is further notable is that many questions relate to the situation of specific credit institutions (mostly those that have run into difficulties for various reasons). It can be observed that in many, albeit certainly not in all, instances the MEPs focus on issues that are of interest to the banking sector of the country from which they come from. A notable example in this regard is when Irish MEPs ask questions concerning the health of individual banks in Ireland. 71 The significance of this observation lies in the fact that MEPs in principle do not represent national constituencies, but rather the Union citizens. 72 In instances where questions concern specific cases of supervised credit institutions, the Chair of the Supervisory Mechanism regularly invokes her confidentiality obligations under EU banking legislation and answers the question in a somewhat more general fashion.
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A second category of questions that can be observed from the hearings are those that concern issues that clearly fall outside the remit of the SSM. Notwithstanding (and perhaps partly because 
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A third, distinct category concerns questions that touch upon cross-cutting issues that do not only fall within the remit of one institution, agency or body, such as where a bank was put into resolution and there were also questions about money laundering; or questions about whether low interest rates are having an impact on the profitability of banks. 77 In some cases, these issues concern both the tasks conferred upon the ECB's Supervisory Board and those given to another EU agency/body, such as in the case of a credit institution that is put into resolution, whereby questions are raised about the supervisor's role in preventing the failure of the bank. 78 In other cases, questions may concern the exercise of the duties of the Supervisory Board and the national authorities concerned, such as in the case of a bank which was recapitalised and there were also problems with money laundering. Money laundering can be a sign of poor risk management and internal control. 79 What can be observed is that the Chair of the Supervisory Board commonly refers to the limits of her mandate, and retorts that this is a question for the national justice While it can be observed that the 'atmosphere' in those meetings was, generally speaking, very polite and civil, the mood notably deteriorated whenever the MEPs sensed a failure of the SSM, such as was namely the case whenever a bank had run into difficulties and a meeting was held shortly afterwards, or whenever a bank had been preventatively recapitalised. Chair of the Supervisory Board is also frequently asked to comment on the actions of the monetary policy function of the ECB -an issue clearly falling outside her mandate, which nevertheless touches upon bank profitability.
Overall, the impression one gets from a first qualitative analysis of these hearings is that the MEPs do not (explicitly) ask questions on the achievement of the SSM's objectives, but rather focus on the overall performance of the banking sector or the financial health of individual banks.
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objectives falling within the Board's mandate (for example, a lack of investor and consumer protection can have an impact on financial stability). 88 This makes for a rather contextual discussion, which does not sharply focus on whether the ECB has achieved its objectives as a prudential supervisor of credit institutions. To be sure, this might be an inevitable consequence of the young age of the SSM, which has only been operating for less than three years. It should further be noted that the MEPs are clearly very grateful for the work done by the SSM officials, and they have repeatedly made that clear, especially in the very first hearings. 89 Be that as it may, they can also be very critical of the performance of the SSM, as noted above.
Moreover, considering the questions asked by the MEPs so far, there is no (explicit) dissatisfaction shared among them with the accountability arrangements for the SSM that are currently in force or with the role given to the European Parliament in holding the Supervisory Board to account for the exercise of its duties. 90 This is not to say that there are no references to accountability or transparency. However, such terminology seems to be used to bolster a substantive point made by
MEPs or when more information is requested on a specific issue. On very few occasions, the MEPs have asked for (or recommended) the publication of reports by private entities 91 or lobbying letters. 92 On a related matter, there are a small number of questions on whether the Chair of the SSM feels independent enough (from the ECB) to exercise her supervisory duties. 93 It is no secret, and indeed it is hardly a surprise, that some MEPs do not seem to be satisfied with the institutional form that the Supervisory Board took, i.e. as a body of the ECB, rather than as a separate institution.
As regards the use made of the internal and external briefing papers referred to in the beginning of this section, the MEPs mostly draw on issues discussed in the notes (or briefing papers) prepared by the Economic Governance Support Unit in advance of the meetings of the ECON Committee.
These are, largely speaking, the 'issues of the day', which makes for a rather contextual discussion. What is more, formally speaking it is the Governing Council of the ECB rather than its Supervisory
Board that adopts supervisory decisions.
This rather sober assessment of the instruments at the disposal of the European Parliament to hold the ECB to account for the exercise of its duties is all the more regrettable considering that it derives from a first analysis that the information requirements under the SSM Regulation and the Interinstitutional Agreement paired with the (internal organisation of the) regular hearings and ad hoc exchanges do provide for a robust beginning for the European Parliament to understand and evaluate policy decisions and their rationale and, more generally, to remove information asymmetries also with regard to the public at large. This positive picture is somewhat mitigated by the relative vagueness of the SSM's objective(s), as well as the parallel existence of other Union bodies and agencies which pursue partially overlapping objectives. 96 Regulation 806/2014 is based on Article 114 TFEU.
As has been emphasised in the introduction, this paper is work in progress. Thus, additional analytical work is required with regard to the conceptual approach to accountability (e.g. the role of public opinion and credibility in the market as accountability mechanisms), the accountability framework of the SSM Regulation, and the actual exchanges between the European Parliament and the ECB. With regard to the accountability framework, a closer look at the broad objective(s) 
